In this paper, we investigate a Stackelberg leader's licensing behavior and its welfare consequence when the rival holds private information about the marginal cost after licensing occurs. In order to examine the effect of the asymmetric information on the optimal licensing strategy, we consider three possible forms of a two-part tariff licensing contract (excluding excluding contract, separating contract, and pooling contract). The result shows that, the optimum is either an exclusive contract with pure royalty on the low type rival or a separating contract with different royalty rates on the different type rivals, which mainly depends on the possibility that the rival is a low type. Furthermore, there is a conflict between the innovator and social welfare when the possibility that the rival is a low type is very high.
Introduction
Licensing has been viewed as a quick and effective method to disseminate technology innovations. It does not transfer the ownership of licensed technology but merely gives licensee the right to use the technology. A key issue is how to develop a scheme to transfer this right to improve innovator's payoffs, incentives and capabilities. A number of previous research has tried to explore the optimal choice for the innovator under different market structures, given the options of fixed-fee, royalty or two-part tariff licensing (see Wang [11, 12] ; Sen and Tauman [10] ; Li and Yanagawa [5] ; Kishimoto and Muto [6] ; Bagchi and Mukherjee [1] ; Chen et al. [2] ; Yan and Yang [13] ). However, a critical assumption made in many existing studies (including the above-mentioned ones) is that the innovator has complete information about its rival's cost and thus designs the corresponding licensing contracts. This may be unrealistic.
In the real world, both the confidentiality of production process and the uncertainty of the application of new technology generally allow the licensee to hold some private information before and/or after technology licensing. In this situation, due to the licensor's limited control over the licensee, it is difficult for both parties to reach an agreement over the value of a technology innovation. Thus, an optimal licensing contract should be designed to prevent the risk of reverse selection or moral hazard caused by this kind of asymmetric information. Gallini and Wright [3] , Poddar and Sinha [7] and Schmitz [8] , all show that a royalty licensing contract can effectively handle the reverse selection problems. Sen [9] argues that the asymmetric information regarding the licensee's costs leads to diversification in optimal licensing mechanisms.
These studies concerning on technology licensing under asymmetric information are routine from the perspective of an outside innovator. In fact, many technology innovators are also the producer in the market. They care about not only the licensing revenue, but also the influence of licensing the new technology on their advantage positions in the competition. Hence, compared to the outside innovators, the inside innovators will face more complicated incentives and have to choose the different licensing mechanisms when they intend to transfer their new technology. Heywood et al. [4] recently explored the insider's optimal two-part tariff licensing contract when it holds imperfect information about the value of the patent. However, they carry out the research based on the assumption that the two firms are simultaneous-move. What will happen if the innovative firm has the first move advantage? Hence, it is necessary to consider this issue in a leadership structure.
In this paper, we expand the consideration of asymmetric information to the licensing decision for an inside innovator who serves as a market leader in a Stackelberg competition. Different from some literature focusing on asymmetric information before licensing occurs, we consider the case in which the rival has some private information about the marginal cost after it obtains the innovation. Due to this asymmetric information, three possible forms of a two-part tariff licensing contract will be examined. The aim is to analyze the effect of the diversification of licensing contract on the optimal strategy and thus what kind of licensing contract will be adopted by the leading firm. Furthermore, the consequence of choosing the optimal licensing contract on social welfare will also be examined to see whether there is a consistency (or conflict) between the innovator and the whole society.
The outline of this study is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the basic model and derive the pre-licensing equilibrium outcomes for the two firms. Section 3 investigates three possible form of a two-part tariff licensing contract. Section 4 compares the three above-mentioned forms of licensing contract. In Section 5, we offer the conclusions.
The basic model and the no-licensing case
Consider a Stackelberg model with two firms, the leader (firm 1) and the follower (firm 2). Only the leader undertakes technology innovation and may license it to the follower. Prior to technology licensing, the leader and follower's initial marginal costs are respectively 0 and .
c If the follower obtains the innovation, then its marginal cost will become private information and the leader will only has a prior belief about it. With the probability ,  the leader believes that the follower's marginal cost is 0 (the low type, referred to as "l") and with the probability (1 ),   the leader believes the follower's marginal cost is () cc  (the high type, referred to as "h"). Here,  is the common knowledge to both firms.
The whole game comprises of two stages. In the first stage, the leader offers a two-part tariff contract (the combination of fixed-fee and per-unit royalty) to the follower, and the follower decides whether or not to accept the contract. If the follower accepts the contract, it will pay the licensing fee according to the contract and the marginal cost will be reduced; if the follower does not, nothing will occur. In the second stage, given the technological configuration at the end of the first stage, the two firms choose their outputs sequentially and compete in the market. The whole game will be solved by backward induction.
The linear inverse demand function is assumed by 12 , p a   where p is the market price, and 1 q and 2 q are the outputs of firms 1 and 2, respectively. If the two firms' marginal costs are given by 1 c and 2 , c then in the competition stage, the Stackelberg equilibrium quantities for the two firms are
. 24 a c c a c c q c c q c c      (1) and the corresponding payoffs are where the superscript "NL" denotes "no-licensing." The innovation is drastic if the follower is driven out of the market ( 2 0 NL q  ) and the leader becomes a monopolist. Therefore, we only focus on the general and more interesting case where the innovation is non-drastic and assume that 3 ca  throughout the whole study.
We also assume that social welfare is defined as the sum of the two firms' profits and consumer surplus. Hence, in the no-licensing case, it follows 
The licensing case
In this section, we analyze a two-part tariff licensing contract and its implication for social welfare. Due to the uncertainty of the follower's type, the licensing contract will appear as three different forms, and the leader's total profit will become the expected profit. In order to facilitate the following discussion, we first give the general equilibrium in the competition stage.
Suppose that the two firms' marginal costs are 1 c and 2 , c respectively, and the follower accepts the two-part licensing contract ( , ) Fr offered by the leader. Then, the profit functions of the two firms in the competition stage are
The equilibrium results are given as follows 
The excluding contract
In this case, the leading firm offers a contract acceptable only to the low type rival. In order to exclude the high type one, the offered contract ( , )
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Frto both types should satisfy 3( ) 2.
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Then, the follower is a low type and accepts the license with the possibility of  , whereas if it is a high type, it rejects the license with the possibility of (1 ) .   Hence, the leader's maximization problem is described as
The participation constraints (9) ensure that the low type follower will accept the contract but the high type follower won't. The maximum fixed-fee that can be charged by the leader is 22 (0, 0, ) .
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Fr   Substitute it into Eq. (8), we have
. F r F r to both types, the maximization problem of the leader's expected profit is described as follows
.
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Here, constraints (14) and (15) are the participation constraints to guarantee that both types of followers will accept the licensing contract; constraints (16) and (17) are the incentive compatibility constraints to ensure that the follower chooses the right contract designed for its own type, where 2 lh  denotes the deviation payoff of the low type follower after falsely choosing ( , )
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Frand 2 hl  denotes the deviation payoff of the high type follower after falsely choosing ( , );
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Fr constraint (18) suggests the maximum royalties that the leader can set in the contract.
Before solving this maximization problem, we should first compute the follower's deviation payoff in constrains (16) and (17). Consider the case in which the low type follower pretends to be a high type one in the competition stage, the leader believes it is a high type and decides its output 1 ( ) / 2. lh q Thus, the market equilibrium price and the low type follower's payoff are respectively 2 2 
11
( Due to asymmetric information after licensing occurs, we can conjecture that the low type follower has an incentive to pretend to be a high type one in order to pay a lower royalty rate and thus be more aggressive in the competition, whereas the high type follower usually accepts the right contract designed for its own type. Hence, the IC constraint for the low type and the participation constraint for the high type must be binding at the optimum. Thus, from the binding conditions (15) and (16) 
Then, the form of the maximization problem reduces as 
The pooling contract
In this case, the same licensing contract is offered to the follower, regardless of its type. Since the follower's marginal cost is still the private information and its production emerges as a random variable, the leader chooses its output only according to the follower's expected output in the competition stage. Thus, the associated profits of the two firms are
a q E Q q c q rE () EQ are the follower's expected marginal cost and output, respectively.
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 is the corresponding expected profit. Solve for the equilibrium outputs, we have
Substitute the two equations into the best-response function of the follower, 2 
Thus, the expected profit for the leader is
Suppose that the leader offers a pooling contract ( , ),
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Fr the maximization problem can be described as follows 12 ( , ) max (0, ) ( (0))
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Since 22 (0, , ) (0, 0, ), 
Substituting it into to the objective function and from the first-order condition with respect to , P r we have the optimal royalty is 
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The corresponding social welfare is 
The comparison results
In above sections, we have obtained the leader's profits in each possible form of the two-part tariff licensing contract. Now, we should explore which form of the two-part tariff licensing contract is the optimal choice for the leading firm. A comparison across the leader's profits yields the following proposition. The proof is completed. □ Proposition 1 illustrates that if there is a high possibility that the follower is a low type, then the leader prefers the excluding contract to extract the royalty rate as high as possible to refrain this potential strong competitor from being aggressive in the final competition. Although the leader loses any royalty revenue from the high type one under this contract, it turns out that this kind of licensing revenue is rather small when  is high, and thus can be compensated by the low type's payments if the charged rate is raised to the maximum. In other words, when the difference between the marginal cost realizations is quite large after licensing occurs, the leader has an incentive to drop to license to both type followers, but only concentrate on the low type one.
If the leader has full information about the rival's realized marginal cost, both types would be licensed with the optimal rates 32 social welfare. Hence, the pooling contract is preferred by society as it is consistent with the social optimally, which requires that the innovation be licensed fully disseminated and all the firms produce efficiently.
Conclusions
We have examined a Stackelberg leader's licensing behavior of an innovation when its rival holds private information about the costs after licensing occurs. The results show that the optimal licensing contract is either a excluding contract only for the low type rival being licensed by a pure royalty, or a separating contract with both type rivals being licensed by different royalty rates, which mainly depends on the possibility that the rival emerge as a low type one. This serves to verify the preference of royalty licensing by the innovator in a Stackelberg competition structure given asymmetric information and the option of a two-part tariff contract.
In addition, from the perspective of social welfare, given the possibility that the rival is a low type is relative large, social welfare in pooling contract is better than the other two forms. It demonstrates that there is still a conflict between the innovator and the whole society even under asymmetric information.
Overall, the result derived in this paper may provide a new explanation to the optimal licensing choice of the two-part tariff licensing contract when the both parties have asymmetric information about the marginal cost after licensing occurs. However, our analysis is based on the stylized set-up and the robustness still needs to be verified in more sophisticated frameworks. For example, the demand function for the product is restricted to be linear. The future work can be made with a more general demand function. This could include not only alternative functional forms, but also imagining competitors with differentiated products. In addition, in this paper, the two firms are all assumed to be fully private. What will happen if the leading firm is a mixed ownership one? Thus, the case of a mixed competition may be another direction for future research.
